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Abstract
This paper describes the dynamics of firms’ exports to different countries. Using a panel of almost
19,000 French exporters, we define an export-relation as an observed positive export flow from a French
firm to a destination. We establish the following facts: 1. There is a great deal of dynamics in firms’
export relations that washes out at a more aggregate level; 2. Export values shipped by individual firms
to specific destinations are very volatile: most of the changes occur within established export relations
(intensive margin), with new relations or relations that are terminated (extensive margin)contributing little
to adjustments in export value at firm level ; 3. Export flows within a newly-created relation involve very
small values, often inferior to 1000 euros; 4. Export-relations are also very volatile. Moreover, from year to
year single firms create and destroy relations simultaneously, and countries are simultaneously involved in
the formation and termination of relations; 5. Formation or termination of export relations and changes in
export values are explained mostly by firm-country specific shocks; 6. The share of relations continued from
one year to the next is correlated with country characteristics: it is higher in bigger and closer markets.
We discuss how those findings could be related to different kind of heterogeneous firm models and to a
relation-specific trade model, arguing that the second one seems to fit more naturally all the documented
facts.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the dynamics of trade relations across destinations using a panel of almost
19.000 French exporters over the five-year period 1995-1999. We define an ”export-relation”1 as a
(positive) shipment by a firm to a destination in a given year. We describe how these export-relations
evolve over time and present a number of stylized facts, many of which are completely novel. Finally,
we relate our findings to the existing firm-level trade literature.
Our results show that export-relations are very volatile. In a typical year around 27 % of all
relations are newly created, and 21 % are destroyed (leaving a net creation of around 6%). Moreover,
export flows associated with specific trade-relations fluctuate a lot. The same firm increases export
flows to some destinations while it decreases them to other destinations. To see how this affects the
growth rate of aggregate French exports we perform the following exercise. For any two subsequent
years we classify export-relations in four groups: created relations (observed whenever a firm does
not export to a destination the previous year but it exports there the year after), destroyed relations
(observed in the opposite case), continuing relations for which export flows increased between the two
years and continuing relations for which export flows decreased. We then calculate the contribution
of each group of export-relations on the gross growth rate of aggregate French exports. We find
that in a typical year the contribution of newly created relations is of 7.3%, the contribution of
destroyed relations is 3.6%, continued relations with increased flows contribute for 48.1% and continued
relations with reduced flows contribute 41%. This decomposition suggests two facts. First, the net
export growth rate at the aggregate level hides a lot of relation-specific dynamics (since increasing
and decreasing flows mostly cancel out). Second, most of the change in export flows occurs within
existing trade relations (intensive margin), with newly created or destroyed ones (extensive margin)2
contributing very little to changes in export values. Moreover, since a big fraction of trade relations is
created or destroyed every year, this implies that newly created/destroyed relations involve very small
values.
Taking a closer look at these values, we find that the smallest 10% of flows within newly created
(or destroyed) relations involve shipments worth less than 1000 euros and that this pattern is broadly
consistent across sectors and destinations. Even median flows are initially not much larger than 5000
euros. However, export flows tend to increase with the age of the relationship.
We then separate firms according to their size and apply the previous decomposition. We find
1Or ”trade-relation” or simply ”relation”.
2In this paper we use Chaney (2008)’s definition of extensive and intensive margin. The former is given by the flows
with which relations are created or terminated while the latter is given by flows within existing relations.
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that the extensive margin is more relevant for small exporters since a larger fraction of changes in
their export flows is explained by those relations which are newly created or terminated. By repeating
the decomposition for different groups of countries we also reveal that the extensive margin is more
relevant for less ”popular” countries, the ones to which French firms export less, since a larger fraction
of changes in French exports is explained by newly created or destroyed relations.
As a next step we ask what kind of shocks may drive the observed dynamics. A simple dummy
regression reveals that a great amount of the trade dynamics at the relation level seems to be due
to relation-specific shocks. In fact a typical firm simultaneously creates trade relations with some
destinations while destroying trade relations with others. Similarly, a given firm tends to increase
values shipped to some destinations while decreasing values shipped to others. At the same time a
typical destination experiences simultaneous entry of some firms and exit of others.
Even if around 27% of relations are created or terminated, the majority of them (the remaining
78%) are stable. We find that the probability for a firm to export to a specific destination conditional
on having exported there the previous year is much larger than the probability to export to this
destination for a random firm. This means that export relations are persistent. While persistence
(measured as the fraction of firms that export to a destination in two consecutive years relative to
total exporters) is stable across sectors, we find that it is positively correlated with destination market
size (GDP, per capita GDP and population) and negatively correlated with distance to the destination.
Having described the micro-dynamics of export relations and flows, we turn to contrast the un-
covered facts with theoretical models on firm-level trade. We first consider the standard theoretical
framework provided by the Melitz (2003) model. Many findings may be compatible with a shock
augmented version of that model (where shocks are aimed at explaining the creation and destruction
of relations). Others, however, seem hard to square with such a model. First, exporter-destination
specific shocks seem to play a large role in explaining entry and exit and these remain unexplained.
Second, the large amount of starting trade relations that involve only small values is difficult to
reconcile with a model where exporters face important (sunk) fixed costs to export 3.
As an alternative, we sketch a model where trade is relationship specific and exporters need to
find a distributor in each destination. Since the quality of the partner is initially uncertain, trade
relations start small and are unstable in the beginning, which provides a micro-foundation for exporter-
destination specific shocks. In this context, moreover, both persistence of trade relations and small
3Unless the structure of those costs is such that a firm pays them only for becoming an exporter and not to export to
each destination. However, these costs are intended to represent costs to explore the market, to find a partnership and
so on, so it is implausible that they are not specific to a trade relation.
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export values could be easily rationalized as well.
The findings of this paper are related to a recent literature which links persistence of exports to
sunk fixed costs. Starting with the contributions of Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and
Jensen (2004), a line of empirical work that is based on the idea of sunk fixed costs to export (Baldwin
and Krugman (1989), Dixit (1989)) has investigated the dynamics of firms’ export status. These
papers use firm level data sets which provide information on aggregate export values per firm but not
on the destinations to which firms export nor on the value shipped to each destination. The general
conclusion is that firms’ export status is very persistent. Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) structurally
estimate a model with heterogeneous firms and sunk costs to export using a panel of Columbian
exporters and provide numbers for the estimated sunk fixed costs to export of approximately 400,000
U.S. dollars for these firms.
Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008) use a cross section
of the same French firm-level data set we exploit in this paper to describe export patterns across
destinations. In Eaton et al. (2004) they reveal that most exporters sell to only one destination,
and this tends to be a popular one, while few firms export to many destinations, which also include
the unpopular ones. Eaton et al. (2008) fit a quantitative version of the Melitz (2003) model of
heterogeneous firms to the cross section of French firms to assess how well this model performs in
explaining export patterns across markets.
The papers most closely related to ours are the simultaneous contributions by Eaton, Eslava, Kugler
and Tybout (2007), who study the dynamics of Colombian exporters across destinations, and Lawless
(2007), who investigates the export patterns of a sample of Irish exporting firms across destinations
and time. While many of their findings are in line with ours, they focus on somewhat different aspects
of export relation dynamics. Eaton et al. (2007)’s analysis is centered on the observation that most new
entrants in a destination sell initially very small values and only few survive in the long run. Those,
which do survive, however, grow very fast and contribute a fair amount to aggregate Columbian export
growth in the longer run. Lawless is interested in the simultaneous entry and exit of firms in a given
destination, the gradual fashion in which exporters expand the number of destinations to which they
export and the small contribution of new relations to aggregate export growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the data; section 3 to section 5
describe the dynamics of trade relations and trade flows, uncovering ten new facts; in section 6 we
provide a discussion of the findings and relate them to different models; section 7 concludes.
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2 Data set
The main data source for our analysis is the Douane data base, available at the French Statistical
Agency (INSEE-Institute National de la Statistique et des E´tudes E´conomiques), which contains all
French Customs data. For each firm it allows us to precisely observe its exports to any destination
in a given year. Each firm is assigned to a sector using the 3-digit NES classification system, which,
excluding agriculture and services, consists of up to 60 industries.
Douane data report 97% of the value of national trade. According to the requirements of Eurostat,
Doaune data should contain all flows which are above 1,000 euros for extra-EU trade and above 200
euros for intra-EU trade. However, this is not always the case in the original data set where also much
smaller flows are reported. This may be the consequence of a misreporting problem. 4
We use the BRN - Be´ne´fices Re´els Normaux data base, also available at INSEE, which provides
information on French firms balance sheets, to eliminate those firms which are exporters according to
Doaune data base but which do not report any export sales in their balance sheet. Finally, we take
all and only those firms which export in at least one year in the time-span we are analyzing (thus we
abstract from those firms which are non-exporters in the whole time span we consider).
Our final data is a panel of almost 19.000 French manufacturing firms which may export to up to
146 destinations5 from 1995 to 1999 .
3 Dynamics of export-relations and export-flows
As the literature has pointed out, the aggregate value of exports can increase either because more
relations are created, or because export flows within existing relations increase. In the context of our
study an export-relation is defined by a positive export flow by a specific French firm to a specific
destination. When a relation is created or destroyed, the value of exports changes through the extensive
margin. Conversely, when flows change within an existing relation then trade is adjusting through its
intensive margin.
In this section we study two phenomena in turn. First, the creation and the destruction of trade
relations through entry and exit of firms in different destinations. Second, the dynamics of export
values through the intensive and extensive margin.
4The analysis we present takes care of this problem: all the results are robust to the exclusion of the 5th and the 10th
percentile of trade flows.
5Countries’ names and codes are reported in the appendix.
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Table 1: Fluctuations in export status
year number new as no-more as net entry into as
of firms exporters percentage exporters percentage export market percentage
1995 18382 - - - - - -
1996 18986 2263 12% 1659 9% 604 3%
1997 19513 2299 12 % 1772 9% 527 3%
1998 19950 2164 11% 1727 9% 437 2%
1999 19996 2003 10% 1957 10% 46 0.2%
3.1 Trade-relation dynamics
We first describe fluctuations in export status, i.e. participation in export activity, that is the
margin of adjustment analyzed by Bernard and Jensen (2004)6. From one year to the other almost
9% of exporters cease to export; conversely, a slightly higher percentage of 12% of exporters, start to
export. This is reported in Table 1, where we observe for each year the number of exporters in the
sample, the number of firms which cease to and those who begin to export. In a typical year there is
a net increase in the number of exporters, which - aggregating entries and exits into export activity -
turns out to be relatively small (3%).7
A similar pattern can be found if we investigate the dynamics of trade relations. Entry into and
exit from specific export destinations are very frequent phenomena. In the first column of Table 2 we
report for each year the number of active relations in the sample 8.
Columns (3) to (5) report the number of destroyed and created relations year by year. We find that
each year around 25% of all firm-destination relations are newly created, while around 21% of relations
are destroyed, with the difference being a positive net creation of trade relations. This suggests that
6Bernard and Jensen (2004) use a data set that provides information whether a firm is an exporter or not. In our case
we also know to which destination a firm exports, thus we can separately analyze export-status and export-relations of
each firm.
7Moreover, a part of the new exporters are firms that will stop to export in one of the subsequent years. This finding
suggests that there is a percentage of exporters which we could consider as occasional exporters, that is firms which
export only from time to time.
8Since the total number of destinations in the data is 146 and in 1995 we have 18.382 exporters, the average number
of destinations to which French firms export is roughly eight. As EKK (2004) have shown the distribution of the number
of export destinations is very skewed, with very few firms exporting to almost all destinations and the majority of them
exporting only to one destination.
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Table 2: Trade relations created and destroyed
year relations created as percentage destroyed as percentage net creation as percentage
1995 157558 - - - - - -
1996 167279 43629 27.7% 33908 21.5% 9721 6.2%
1997 177513 45715 27.3% 35481 21.2% 10234 6.1%
1998 183595 44721 25.1% 38639 21.7% 6082 3.4%
1999 185849 43394 23.6% 41140 21.4% 2254 1.2%
there is a lot of trade micro-dynamics which remains hidden when we aggregate statistics. This is true
across years and across sectors9. Finally, it is worth noticing that around 50% of the destroyed relations
are re-created in at least one subsequent year and around 70% of created relations are destroyed in at
least one subsequent year in the sample.
We can conclude that: export relations are very volatile (FACT 1).
3.2 Export-relations by firm and country
In this subsection we analyze the previous patterns considering firms and countries separately.
The creation and destruction of trade relations is related to firm size. In Figure 1 we plot for each
firm the share of entered and exited destinations against firm size (measured by firms’ total export
value in logs). Small firms enter and exit a larger fraction of their export destinations10. This is also
more formally confirmed by a regression of the fraction of created/destroyed relations on firms’ total
exports:
Ni,enter
Ni
= β0 + β1Exportsi + i (1)
and
Ni,exit
Ni
= β0 + β1Exportsi + i (2)
where Ni is the total number of destinations served by a given firm in a year, Ni,enter (Ni,exit) is
the number of destinations to which a firm begins (ceases) to export and Exporti are total export
9We do not report all the sectoral analysis in the paper since all the findings hold for different sectors.
10We report the graph without the biggest five percent of firms’ exports to show that the correlation is not driven by
a few large observations. For bigger firms that export to many countries, the share of exited/entered destinations could
be very small by construction. The same could happen for very small exporters that export only to one destination. The
correlation is still negative eliminating the smallest 5% or 10% of exporters.
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flows by a firm (in logs). β1 is negative and very significant in both cases11. Evaluating the regressions
at the mean, they imply that an average exporter creates around 36% of its relations and destroys
around 31%.
Figure 1: Share of entered and exited destinations over firm export size
If we focus at the destination level, we find that the fraction of trade relations created and destroyed
is higher in less popular destinations (measured by total French exports to that destination). This
can be seen from Figure 2 and is also confirmed when regressing the fraction of created and destroyed
relations in each country on the total exports to that country:
Nc,enter
Nc
= β0 + β1Exportsc + c (3)
Nc,exit
Nc
= β0 + β1Exportsc + c, (4)
where c is a country index. These results confirm that total exports to a country are significantly
negatively correlated with the fraction of entering and exiting firms12.
Notice that these results are not mechanical. Even if in a given year the number of exporters to
Germany (DE) is higher than the number of exporters to Azerbaijan (AZ), this does not imply that
11For entries: β1 = −0.00029(∗∗∗) R2 = 0.02, n = 16723. For exits: β1 = −0.00047(∗∗∗) R2 = 0.04, n = 18382.
12For entries: β1 = −2.92(∗∗∗), R2 = 0.52, n=146. For exits: β1 = −2.08(∗∗∗), R2 = 0.56, n=146
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Figure 2: Fraction of firms entering/leaving vs. total French exports by country
in the following year the share of entrants in Germany is much smaller than in the share of entrants
in Azerbaijan. In fact only half of the exporters in the data set export to Germany, thus in principle
the share of entrants in this country could be much higher than the 10% we observe in the data.
We conclude that creation and destruction of trade relations is more frequent for small
firms and small destinations (FACT 2).
3.3 Trade-flow dynamics
Is the phenomenon discussed in last subsection relevant in terms of export values? Do newly cre-
ated/destroyed relations involve large flows? In this subsection we address this issue by considering the
adjustment in export values that occurs within newly created/destroyed relations (extensive margin)
and within existing ones (intensive margin).
We denote with Qt the value of aggregate French exports (given by the sum of the flows of all
existing relations in a year qict), and index firms by i, countries by c and years by t. Then we have
Qt =
∑
i∈I
∑
c∈C
qict. (5)
We consider growth in export values using mid-point growth rates13:
13This overcomes the problem that we would have with ordinary growth rates, which are not defined for cre-
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Gt =
∑
c∈C
∑
i∈I
gictsict, (6)
where sict is the average export share of firm i in country c in total French exports,
sict =
qict + qict−1
Qt +Qt−1
(7)
and gict is the midpoint-growth rate of export value of firm i in country c,
gict =
qict − qict−1
1/2 (qict + qict−1)
. (8)
To see to what extent adjustments in export values are due to the extensive margin and to the
intensive margin, we classify all trade-relations into four subsets: entry - the newly formed relations
(those for which qict−1 = 0 and qict > 0 ), exit - the destroyed relations (for which qict−1 > 0 and
qict = 0), increase - the continuing relations for which export flows increase (0 < qict−1 < qict), and
decrease - the continuing relations for which the export flows decrease (qict−1 > qict > 0). We can
thus write:
Gt =
∑
ic∈entry
gictsict +
∑
ic∈exit
gictsict +
∑
ic∈increase
gictsict +
∑
ic∈decrease
gictsict (9)
To get a better sense of the magnitudes and the relative contributions of each of the four terms we
take absolute values of mid-point growth rates of all firm-destination relations, and aggregate them to
obtain the gross export growth rate, Ĝt:
Ĝt =
∑
ic∈entry
|gict|sict +
∑
ic∈exit
|gict|sict +
∑
ic∈increase
|gict|sict +
∑
ic∈decrease
|gict|sict (10)
Table 3 reports the gross (mid-point) growth rate, the contribution of each of the four components
of decomposition (10), as well as the aggregate net growth rate for different years. The net midpoint
growth rate of exports is roughly 1%, while the gross midpoint growth rate is almost 10%. This
difference indicates that export flows are very volatile as well. The contribution of newly-created and
destroyed relations to the gross growth rate are respectively 7.3% and 3.6% in 1996. The intensive
margin explains the rest, with increasing flows within existing relations explaining 48% and decreasing
flows within existing relations explaining 41%.
This pattern is very similar across different years and for all the sectors as shown in Figure 3.
ated/destroyed relations. Notice that the mid-point growth rate lies in the interval [-2,2] and takes the value -2 in
the case of exit and 2 in the case of entry.
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Table 3: Mid point growth rates by year. Percentages explained by components.
gross net enter exit increase decrease
1996 0.100 0.011 7.3% 3.6% 48.1% 41.0%
1997 0.102 0.038 6.4% 2.7% 62.2% 28.8%
1998 0.097 0.016 5.0% 3.7% 53.4% 37.9%
1999 0.095 0.002 4.7% 3.5% 46.4% 45.4%
We conclude that flows are very volatile and most changes in value occur at the intensive
margin (FACT 3). Thus while creation and destruction of trade relations is very frequent, it involves
shipments of small values.
Figure 3: Intensive and Extensive margin contributions to export growth by sector
3.4 Small quantities
We next take a closer look at the level of flows involved in starting relations. In Table 4 we report
the average and median export values for all relations, relations that were created (terminated) in
1996 and persisted during the whole observation period and relations that were created (destroyed) in
1996 but were destroyed (recreated) in some subsequent year. Relations that are created or destroyed
involve very small values. Moreover, relations that start in 1996 and last for all the remaining years
in the sample, have higher average values than occasional relations (146,961 vs 36,281 euros).
To investigate how small entry values can be we consider the smallest ten percent of entry values14
14Exit values behave similarly, even though they are smaller than entry ones.
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Table 4: Average and median exports flows (in euros)
1995-1996 average median
All relations in 1995 640,997 28,084
Relations destroyed permanently in 1996 45,213 4,871
Occasionally destroyed relations (for 1996 only) 42,038 6,131
All relations in 1996 630,214 27,796
Relations created permanently in 1996 146,961 13,266
Occasionally created relations (for 1996 only) 36,281 6,595
and plot them against our measure of market size (log of GDP) (Figure 4). The 10th percentile is
around 1000 euros for most countries, while for European ones it is even smaller. This may derive
from different reporting thresholds in the Douane database, which implies that the smallest actual
export flows are likely to involve even smaller values than the ones reported here.
Figure 4: 10th percentile of entry quantities by country
To investigate whether entry values differ substantially across sectors, we report percentiles by
sector in Table 5. The 10th percentile of export values at entry varies from 659 euros in the ”Printing
and Publishing sector” to 1095 euros in the ”Drugs” sector. We conclude that the phenomenon of
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Table 5: Entry flows by percentile and 2-digit NES sector
sectors Entry flows by percentile
10st 30th 50th 70th 90th
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 963 2911 6522 15314 56098
Apparel, Textile and Leather Products 876 1878 3999 9497 40973
Printing and Publishing 659 1497 3129 8583 41376
Drugs, Soaps and Cleaners 1095 3201 7359 19742 84750
Furniture and Fixture 866 1877 3927 9783 36942
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 882 2577 6715 16362 85082
Transportation Equipment 777 2148 5119 19330 163883
Mechanic Equipment 902 2378 5530 14620 63692
Electric and Electronic Equipment 955 2470 5793 13980 52484
Mineral Products (Stone, Clay and Glass Products) 953 2347 5971 14779 60394
Textile Mill Products 797 2263 4868 11697 40935
Paper and Allied Products, Lumber and Wood Products 892 2928 6636 14695 62439
Chemicals and Allied Products 979 2456 5723 14023 54882
Fabricated Metal Products 898 1986 4514 10224 38354
Electric and Electronic Components 854 1953 5151 14729 63951
observing small entry values does not depend much on the specific sector we look at. Even when
disaggregating sectors even further things do not change.
Finally, even though starting relations involve small export flows, export flows tend to increase
as relations mature. This is shown in Figure 5 where we report box plots of export values by age
of relation. The box plot reports the median, the 25th and 75th percentiles as well as the minimum
and maximum export values by age of the relation. Clearly, the median increases over time and the
distribution becomes more and more left skewed, as some relations grow larger and larger.15
The message is clear: (FACT 4) an average firm enters an average destination with very
small flows which tend to increase as the relation gets older.
3.5 Trade-flow dynamics by firm and destination
In order to see how the intensive and the extensive margin relate to firm and destination size,
we report decomposition (10) for different sub-samples. First, we divide the sample along the firm
dimension considering small exporters (whose export flows are below the 25th percentile of aggregate
15We exclude the 5% largest observations from the plot because including them would make the graph unreadable.
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Figure 5: Export flows distribution by relation age
firm exports), medium (25th-75th percentile) and large (above 75th percentile) ones.
Table 6 shows the results for growth rates between 1995 and 1996. The extensive margin is much
more important for small exporters. These exporters contribute 2.1% to the aggregate export growth
rate and 96.5% of their contribution comes from movements along the extensive margin. For big
exporters instead, movements along the extensive margin account only for 7.7%. Note also that 93%
of gross growth in export values comes from the 25 percent of largest exporters.
The fact that the extensive margin is more relevant for small firms can also be seen from Figure
6. It plots for each firm the fraction of gross changes in export flows coming from newly formed or
Table 6: Contribution of components by firm size percentiles
percentile enter (%) exit (%) increase (%) decrease (%) total (%)
1-25 95.8 0.7 3.4 0.1 2.1
25-75 20.6 12.5 41.7 25.2 4.8
75-100 4.7 3.2 49.4 42.7 93.1
all 7.3 3.6 48.1 41.0 100
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Table 7: Contribution of components by country size percentiles
percentile enter (%) exit (%) increase (%) decrease (%) total (%)
1-25 30.6 20.5 28.2 20.6 4
25-75 15.5 7.0 44.9 32.5 13.4
75-100 6.0 3.0 48.6 42.4 86.2
all 7.3 3.6 48.1 41.0 100
destroyed relations against the value of its total exports (in logs). The correlation is negative and
statistically very significant16.
Figure 6: Fraction of change in values shipped to entered/exited destinations vs. total firm exports
Next, we divide the sample in small (1st to 25th percentile of export values), medium (25th-75th
percentile) and large (above 75th percentile) export destinations and perform the same analysis. From
Table 7 we observe that the fraction of export growth rates explained by those firms that newly enter
or exit from a given market is larger in less popular export destinations.
This can also be seen from Figure 7, which plots the contribution of the extensive margin (in its
two components) against total exports to country c (in logs). 17
16enter: βqi = −0.042(∗∗∗) R2 = 0.15 n = 16723; exit: βqi = −0.063(∗∗∗) R2 = 0.23, n = 18382.
17All the figures in this section, obtained without eliminating the smallest or largest percentiles are similar.
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Figure 7: Extensive margin over total exports by country
Again, we observe a large and statistically very significant negative correlation18.
We conclude that the extensive margin is more relevant for small exporters and less
popular destinations (FACT 5).
3.6 Explaining trade-flow dynamics
At this point it seems interesting to get an idea of what drives the changes in export values of firms
across destinations. Are changes mainly due to firm-specific shocks, due to country-specific shocks or
due to those shocks that hit a specific trade relation (country-firm specific shocks)?
In order to answer this question, we regress mid-point export growth rates for each firm in each
served destination between any two years, gict, on a set of firm-time (δit) and country-time (δct)
dummies19:
gict = δit + δct + ict, (11)
where the dummies are intended to capture firm-level time-varying (supply) shocks and country-
level time-varying (demand) shocks respectively.
Looking at Table 8, we find that firm-level shocks and country-level shocks alone explain respec-
18For enter: βqc = −0.05(∗∗∗) R2 = 0.52, n = 146. For exit: βqc = −0.04(∗∗∗) R2 = 0.45, n = 146
19We thus have 4 time observations (1995-1996; 1996-1997; 1997-1998; 1998-1999) for each firm-country pair.
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Table 8: Explaining changes in export values
Period all all 95-96 95-96
sample all staying all staying
observations 939,856 569,352 214,739 131,175
Adjusted R2 (including only δit ) 0.07 0.05
Adjusted R2 (including only δct ) 0.004 0.009
Adjusted R2 (including δct and δit) 0.09 0.06
tively around 7% and 0.4% of flow growth rate at the firm-destination level (as measured by the
adjusted R2). Even when we perform the regression including both shocks simultaneously (columns
(3) and (4) 20), the explained variation of the dependent variable is not bigger than 10%. Results are
similar if we exclude entries and exits from the regression (which take on extreme values) and if we
consider different years (for the last two regressions).
We thus conclude that: export flow volatility is mostly explained by firm-country specific
shocks (FACT 6).
4 Simultaneity
4.1 Firm level
The big amount of destroyed and created relations we observed in the second section may be
the result of two different types of firm micro-behavior: it may be that some firms destroy relations,
while other firms create new ones or that each firm simultaneously creates and destroys relations. To
investigate this we look at the behavior of individual firms. Figure 8 plots for each firm i the number
of destinations it entered against the number of destinations it left between 1995 and 1996. If a firm
starts new relations without destroying any of the existing ones, then this observation lies on the x-axis
(viceversa if a firm destroys relations without creating new ones, then it lies on the y-axis).
We observe that, indeed, many observations lie off the axes, thus indicating that exit and entry are
simultaneous activities at the firm level. Moreover, the correlation among the two is positive: firms
that create more relations tend to also simultaneously destroy a larger number of them.21
20In these last two columns we consider only the export mid-point growth rate between 1995 and 1996 because of
computational limitations.
21From the figure one may get the impression that there is a negative correlation, however, there are much more
observations off the axes than close to them, which is not clear in the picture.
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Figure 8: Number of entered vs. exited destinations
This observation holds regardless of the total number of destinations that firm i is exporting to.
Figure 9 plots the fraction of destinations entered against the fraction of destinations from which a
firm exits and again we observe a positive relationship confirming that firms enter some destinations
while simultaneously leaving others. The correlation between the fraction of entered destinations and
the left ones is 0.53 for the entire sample and similar across sectors.22
We conclude that firms simultaneously create and destroy relations (FACT 7).
4.2 Country level
Here, we perform a different exercise and aggregate created and destroyed relations at the country
level. Again two scenarios are possible. If country-specific (demand) shocks are important in driving
the formation of relations, then most of the firms should create (destroy) relations with countries
which experience a positive (negative) shock. In other words we should observe that newly-created
and destroyed relations are negatively correlated at the country level. Alternatively, the findings in
section two may be the consequence of a simultaneous creation and destruction of relations in each
country.
In Figure 10 we thus plot for each country the share of created relations against the share of
22The correlation between the fraction of entered and exited destinations ranges between 0.44 in the sector ”Food,
Beverages and Tobacco” sector 0.62 in the sector ”Transportation Equipment”.
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Figure 9: Fraction of entered vs. exited destinations
destroyed ones.23
This figure clearly shows that simultaneity holds also at the country-level. Moreover, we can see
that European countries like Germany (”DE”), Denmark (”DK”) or Netherlands (”NL”) are the ones
for which entry and exit account for a relatively small fraction of total trade relations compared to small
and distant countries such as Azerbaijan (”AZ”), Sao Tome` and Principe (”ST”) and Guinea-Bissau
(”GW”).
We conclude that relations are simultaneously created and destroyed at the country
level (FACT 8).
4.3 Explaining export-relation dynamics
We can do an analogous exercise to the one performed in the previous section to uncover if the
choice of French firms to enter and exit from various destinations is more explained by firm-level
shocks, by country-level shocks or by firm-country specific ones. We thus run the following regression
Cict = δit + δct + ict, (12)
where the dependent variable Cict is an indicator variable, which refers to the choice of a firm to
23The first share is calculated with respect to the number of exporters in 1995 and the second is calculated with respect
to the number of exporters in 1996.
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Figure 10: Fraction of entered vs fraction of exited firms by country
enter in a given destination at time t (in which case it is equal to 1), to exit from a given destination
(in which case it is equal to −1) or to continue exporting (in this case it takes the value of 0).
Results are reported in Table 9. The first column shows that by introducing only firm-time (supply)
dummies, we explain only 8% of the variation in the dependent variable. By introducing only country-
time (demand) dummies, we explain only around 4% of the variation in the dependent variable. Even
when we consider both country-level and firm-level dummies (although only for a single pair of years)
we manage to explain only up to 10% of the variation of changes in firm-country relations. Thus the
main part of the variation remains unexplained by the sum of country- and firm-specific shocks. Hence,
variation in creation and destruction of trade relations, like variation in trade-flow growth rates, seems
to be more related to factors specific to each firm-country relation.
This pattern holds for different years and for a sub-sample in which we exclude those observations
for which a given firm exports consecutively for two years (column (2) and column (4)).
We thus conclude that: creation and destruction of trade relations is mostly explained
by (country-firm) relation-specific shocks (FACT 9).
5 Persistence
As we have shown previously, firms tend to create and destroy a significant fraction of their trade
relations. Still, most of the relations are stable during years. In this section we turn to describe this
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Table 9: Explaining export-relation dynamics
Period All All 95-96 95-96
sample all only entry/exits all only entry/exits
observations 939,856 370.504 214,739 83,564
Adjusted R2 (including only δit ) 0.08 0.08
Adjusted R2 (including only δct ) 0.04 0.04
Adjusted R2 (including δct and δit) 0.10 0.10
phenomenon.
First, we use a transition matrix to investigate persistence as well as the patterns of creation and
destruction of trade relations in more detail. Each row of Table 10 refers to firms which export to a
given number of destinations, ”0”, ”1”, ”2” and so on in 1995. Each cell reports the frequency with
which firms that exported to a given number of destinations in 1995, transit to any of the column
categories in the following year.24 This means that the rows sum up to 100. The last row reports the
frequency of exporters in each category in 1996.25 Notice that almost 60% of all the firms export to
up to four destinations only.26
Differently from the finding of Eaton et al. (2007) we obtain a diagonal dominant matrix. This
means that, given any initial number of export destinations, the probability to continue exporting to
the same number of destinations is higher than the probability to change.
Non-exporters tend to integrate into the export market gradually, by typically entering in one
destination only (27.66%) and firms that exported to only one destination tend to add or drop only a
single one the year after. Indeed this observation holds for all the considered categories: either firms
continue to export to the same number of destinations, or they transit to the nearest category to the
left or to the right.
The previous table shows that there is persistence in the number of relations, since the probability
of a relation to survive is much larger than the probability to be created or destroyed. However, the
transition matrix does not allow us to determine if the identity of active relations is actually the same
24The last 3 columns and rows aggregate the number of export destinations in a somewhat arbitrary way. However,
results are robust if we define intervals differently.
25Notice that, as explained in the description of the data set, here we are considering those firms which export to at
least one destination in at least one year in the time-span of our sample. Thus the total number of French non-exporters
is much bigger than the 22.62% reported here.
26As in Eaton et al. (2004) only few exporters ship their products to many destinations.
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Table 10: Transition matrix between 1995 and 1996
1995/1996 0 1 2 3 4 5 (6 to 10) (11 to 25) 25 or more
0 63.23 27.66 5.54 1.75 0.71 0.19 0.47 0.29 0.15
1 27.26 49.74 14.07 5.45 2.13 0.67 0.61 0.08 0.00
2 9.30 26.30 32.62 17.29 7.37 3.81 2.97 0.34 0.00
3 3.65 11.65 21.88 27.86 18.55 8.33 7.68 0.33 0.07
4 1.72 3.53 11.21 21.81 24.91 16.55 19.31 0.95 0.00
5 0.81 1.39 4.75 13.66 17.01 21.64 38.54 2.08 0.12
(6 to 10) 0.31 0.66 1.04 2.60 4.33 9.53 62.94 18.39 0.21
(11 to 25) 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.32 9.89 81.64 7.71
25 or more 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.07 6.49 93.17
exporters (in%) 22.62 20.53 9.59 6.80 4.80 3.79 11.97 13.34 6.57
over time27.
Consequently, we fix a firm-destination relationship and follow it over time. Table 11 reports the
fraction of relations that survive from one year to the next for the total economy and for each 2-digit
NES sector. The first row shows that 78% of relations are still maintained in the next year and
58% survive throughout the entire sample period from 1995-1999. If relationships where destroyed
completely randomly, since every year around 22% of trade relations are destroyed, the fraction of
relations that survive four years should be roughly 37% (= 0.784)28. This is an indication of the
existence of persistence.
We finally turn to investigate if persistence of relations is systematically related to country charac-
teristics. Figure 11 shows our proxy of persistence, the share of stable relations (by country), plotted
against countries’ characteristics like GDP, GDP per capita, distance, population, and popularity
(measured in terms of number of French exporters in logs). There is a clear positive relation between
our proxy for persistence and countries’ proxies for market size. The relation becomes negative when
we consider distance, instead.
27It may be that the number of export destinations remains constant but that the identity of export destinations
changes. For example, a firm may export to Spain and Italy in 1995 and to Germany and Russia in 1996: in this case
the transition matrix would report this observation on the diagonal since the number of active relations does not change
from one year to the other.
28When we calculate the same numbers by weighting each firm by its size (in terms of total served destinations) we
find very similar patterns and slightly smaller numbers. This is the case because for bigger firms the number of stable
relations is higher, as we already noticed by looking at the broken relations.
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Figure 11: Persistence vs country characteristics
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Table 11: Fraction of stable relations
95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 95-97 95-98 95-99
Total Economy 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.69 0.63 0.58
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.71 0.65 0.60
Apparel, Textile and Leather Products 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.54
Printing and Publishing 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.61 0.54 0.49
Drugs, Soaps and Cleaners 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.76 0.71 0.67
Furniture and Fixture 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.56
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.58
Transportation Equipment 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.67 0.61 0.56
Mechanic Equipment 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.67 0.61 0.56
Electric and Electronic Equipment 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.61 0.56
Mineral Products 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.71 0.65 0.61
Textile Mill Products 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.71 0.64 0.60
Paper and Allied Products, Lumber and Wood 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.56
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.73 0.67 0.62
Fabricated Metal Products 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.58
Electric and Electronic Components 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.72 0.67 0.63
Even if Figure 11 shows interesting patterns, a caveat applies. Our measure of persistence could
indeed capture the fact that a destination is chosen by any firm in two consecutive years just because
it is an easy destination to export to. In other words since export decisions are not random, this figure
does not show that a firm exports to a country in a given year because it was exporting there in the
previous one.
We are aware that formal econometric analysis, that controls for firm and country characteristics,
would be needed to corroborate the interpretation of these findings. However, this is outside the
purely descriptive scope of our analysis. In leaving more formal analysis for future work, we take these
findings as indicative for this phenomenon.
We conclude that there is a large amount of persistence and that this seems to be related
to market characteristics (FACT 10).
6 Discussion
In the previous sections we have presented new evidence on the micro-dynamics of firms’ exports.
In this section we relate our results to the theoretical literature. We first contrast our findings with
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standard firm-heterogeneity trade models (Melitz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003)
and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). We argue that even though some of the facts we have uncovered
can be rationalized within these frameworks, others are more difficult to explain since these models
provide no micro-foundations for analyzing the dynamics of firms’ export relations. Therefore, we
turn to contrast our results with another class of models that emphasize the relation-specific nature
of trade at the micro-level.
Consider a standard Melitz (2003) model of trade with monopolistic competition, heterogeneous
firms ranked by an exogenous productivity level drawn from some distribution function and fixed costs
to export which need to be paid for each destination. In this model a firm exports to a destination
only if its export revenues (which are a function of its productivity level) are sufficiently high to cover
the fixed cost. This, in turn, implies that for each export market there exists a cutoff-productivity
level such that only firms with a productivity above that cutoff-level export there. As a result, very
unproductive firms do not export, less productive exporters enter only those destinations with a low
cut-off (the most popular ones) and ”superstar” firms export to many destinations, among them the
less popular ones (for which the cut-off level is high). Moreover, while less productive firms lie closer
to the export cut-off (since their productivity is just marginally higher than that), more productive
firms are far away from such cutoffs (for most of the countries where they export to).
In order to discuss our findings in this framework we need to incorporate firm-specific (productivity)
as well as country-specific (demand) shocks along the lines of Eaton et al. (2008) to allow for a source
of dynamics in the model. In addition, we consider the fixed-costs to enter to be at least partially
sunk. In this context many of our findings could be rationalized. In fact, relations are dynamic and
extensive and intensive margins have a different role for bigger firms than for smaller ones. The latter,
whose productivity lies close to the destination-specific cutoff, are likely to exit/enter when they are
hit by demand- or productivity shocks. The former, which are far away from cutoff, rather adjust
their export values along the intensive margin when hit by a shock.
The observation that exporters simultaneously create and destroy relations and that relations are
at the same time created and destroyed at the destination level is, on the contrary, more difficult to
explain in this context. The reason is that a firm that is hit by a positive shock should create relations
without destroying the active ones, and in the same fashion, countries that are hit by positive shocks
should be involved only in newly-created relations. While these patterns could be explained by the
combined effect of these two shocks, our intuition that this is not the case is confirmed by the fact
that variation in relations is not well explained by the sum of country- and firm-shocks but is mainly
due to relation-specific (firm-country specific) shocks.
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We also find very small starting export flows and persistence in relations. In the context of the
Melitz model persistence could be explained by autocorrelated shocks or by the presence of sunk-costs.
The empirical literature that, in more formal frameworks, finds high persistence in export status even
when controlling for shocks, usually interprets this finding as an evidence for the existence of high
sunk start-up costs to export (Bernard and Jensen (2004) for example). Das et al. (2007) provide an
estimation of such costs using a structural estimation for Colombian firms. They find that these costs
are quite substantial, being on average as high as 400,000 dollars. Consequently, they conclude that
producers do not begin to export unless the present value of their future export stream is large. In
the context of our findings the value of exports at entry should thus be related to the present value of
future profits (which in turn is a proxy for the sunk cost of export), especially for the large fraction
of firms that maintain a relation only for a very short time span. What is difficult to explain is the
combination of high persistence (which indicates the existence of high sunk costs) with the very small
values with which relations usually start.29
Alternative models of trade with heterogeneous firms are Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008). The first one is a Ricardian model with variable trade costs, where firms draw
productivities randomly and engage in Bertrand-competition with limit pricing, while the second
model relies on monopolistic competition and markups that are endogenously (negatively) related to
the level of competition. Since fixed costs to export are not a feature of these models because only
more productive firms can charge the lowest price for a given variety (Bernard et al. (2003)) or a
sufficiently low price without incurring a loss (Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)), small export values are
not hard to explain with these models. In a way similar to Melitz (2003) a given shock to a firm causes
more exit and entry for smaller, less productive firms. However, these models have a difficult time to
account for the fact that firms enter with small export values, which tend to grow over time for the
relations that survive. Similarly, explaining simultaneous entry and exit of a given firm in different
destinations is not straightforward with these models.
Since our analysis rather suggests that export-relations have an important role in explaining the
dynamics of trade at the micro-level, we discuss another class of models which emphasize the relation-
ship specific nature of trade and how information externalities may play a crucial role in the decision
29Even if we consider a model a´ la Melitz in which destination-specific export costs are fixed but not sunk, explaining
small values is still not easy. Eaton et al. (2008) show that in order to match the fraction of firms exporting to each
destination, fixed costs to export need to be on average higher in larger destinations. In order to fit the large amount
of small export values they need to give small exporters better chances to draw a small fixed costs, even if average fixed
costs are large.
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of a firm to export. In Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) there is uncertainty about the export
outcome since a firm does not know ex-ante the cost it will face once exporting in the foreign mar-
ket. This uncertainty, which in their model could be attenuated by observing the success or failure
of incumbent exporters in each market, could explain why trade-relations are so dynamic. Rauch
and Watson (2003) develop a model that explains how incomplete information can induce buyers in
industrialized countries to start trade relations with firms located in developing countries with small
orders and how this leads to trade flows that increase over time as the quality of the partner is re-
vealed. Most exporters, in fact, do not sell their products directly to consumers but need to rely on
a local distributor in each destination. Finding a suitable distributor is difficult and involves ex ante
uncertainty about the quality of the match. Araujo and Ornelas (2007) focus on the effect of contract
enforcement on firm level trade dynamics in a setting where the quality of the distributor is initially
unknown and needs to be learned from observed profits.
This class of models can explain why trade relations are so dynamic, why most of the changes
in the value of shipments occurs at the intensive margin, and why the extensive margin is related to
small quantities. Trade relations tend to start small and are more likely to break up in the beginning
of the relation because of uncertainty about the quality of the match.
A matching model can also explain why the extensive margin is more important in unpopular
destinations. Since the value of any match is lower in smaller markets because profits are lower,
matches are more likely to be separated by a given shock.
These models also provide a micro-foundation for firm-country specific shocks and explain why
firms simultaneously create some trade relations while destroying others, since not every attempt to
enter a market is successful. They are also consistent with the fact that overall most adjustment in
values is due to relationship specific shocks.
Even the presence of persistence can easily be explained. Having a partner has positive value, since
searching for another one requires time and potentially resources: this implies an opportunity cost of
foregone profits that leads to persistence of export relations. The fact that persistence is positively
related to market size can also be rationalized by the fact that the opportunity cost of breaking a
relation could be larger in larger markets potentially leading to more persistence of export relations.
Finally, small export values are not a problem for these kind of models either, since there is no
need to rely on per period destination specific fixed costs to explain why not all firms export to all
destinations.
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7 Conclusion
This paper documents several new stylized facts on the dynamics of export relations and export
flows. A typical French exporter often changes its export destinations and the values with which it
enters or leaves destinations are small. The large variation in values shipped by firms to different
destinations occurs above all within existing export destinations, with new entries or exits accounting
only for a small fraction in value adjustments. Larger exporters have more stable export relations and
do the bulk of their changes at the intensive margin, while small exporters enter and leave a larger
fraction of their export markets from one period to the other. Trade relations are also much more
stable in more popular export destinations to which more French firms export. Furthermore, entry
usually involves very small values, sometimes less than 1000 euros.
We argue that, even though a shock-augmented version of the Melitz (2003)-Chaney (2008) model
may rationalize some of our findings, others rather suggest that exporting involves relationship-specific
dynamics. We thus argue that those trade models which provide a micro-foundation for the formation
of export-relations are more suitable to account for all our findings.
Finally, we are aware that our interpretation of the facts uncovered in this paper is casual and is
based exclusively on descriptive evidence. A more formal econometric analysis would be needed to
convincingly discriminate among alternative theories.
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Country code Country name Country code Country name
AG Antigua et Barbuda LC Saint-Lucy
AL Albania LK Sri Lanka
AM Armenia LR Liberia
AO Angola LS Lesotho
AR Argentina LT Lithuania
AT Austria LV Latvia
AU Australia MA Morocco
AZ Azerbadjan MD Moldova
BB Barbade MG Madagascar
BD Bangladesh MK Macedonia
BF Burkina Faso ML Mali
BG Bulgaria MO Macao
BI Burundi MR Mauritania
BJ Benin MT Malta
BO Bolivia MU Mauritius
BR Brazil MW Malawi
BW Botswana MX Mexico
BY Belarus MY Malaysia
BZ Belize MZ Mozambique
CA Canada NA Namibia
CD Congo, Dem. Rep. NE Niger
CF Central African Republic NG Nigeria
CG Congo, Rep. NI Nicaragua
CH Switzerland NL Netherlands
CI Cote d’Ivoire NO Norway
CL Chile NP Nepal
CM Cameroon NZ New Zealand
CN China PA Panama
CO Colombia PE Peru
CR Costa Rica PG Papua New Guinea
CU Cuba PH Philippines
CY Cyprus PK Pakistan
CZ Czech Republic PL Poland
DE Germany PT Portugal
DK Denmark PY Paraguay
DM Dominique RO Romania
DO Dominican Republic RU Russian Federation
DZ Algeria RW Rwanda
EC Ecuador SC Seychelles
EE Estonia SE Sweden
EG Egypt, Arab Rep. SG Singapore
ES Spain SI Slovenia
ET Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) SK Slovak Republic
FI Finland SL Sierra Leone
FJ Fiji SN Senegal
GA Gabon ST Sao Tome and Principe
GB United Kingdom SV El Salvador
GD Grenade SY Syrian Arab Republic
GH Ghana TD Chad
GM Gambia, The TG Togo
GN Guinea TH Thailand
GQ Equatorial Guinea TN Tunisia
GR Greece TR Turkey
GT Guatemala TT Trinidad and Tobago
GY Guyana TW Taiwan
GW Guinea-Bissau TZ Tanzania
HK Hong Kong, China UA Ukraine
HN Honduras UG Uganda
HR Croatia US United States
HT Haiti UY Uruguay
HU Hungary UZ Uzbekistan
ID Indonesia VC Saint-Vincent and the Grenadines
IE Ireland VE Venezuela
IL Israel VN Vietnam
IN India YE Yemen
IR Iran, Islamic Rep. ZA South Africa
IS Island ZM Zambia
IT Italy ZW Zimbabwe
JM Jamaica LB Lebanon
JO Jordan KZ Kazakhstan
JP Japan KR Korea, Rep.
KE Kenya KN Saint-Kitts and Nevis
KG Kyrgyz Republic KH Cambodia
Table 12: List of countries
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